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Despite the current enthusiasms in applying the concept of microfinance as  a 
poverty alleviation tool in many countries, the risk management aspects of 
microfinancing should not be overlooked. This paper highlights several 
incidences of default risks in microfinance and subsequently, provides a 
comprehensive exploratory study on the various ways to handle the default risks 
in microfinance. While there are social and religious objectives embedded in 
extending microfinancing, fact is that the financiers are business entities having 
the objectives of maximizing returns and minimizing losses. In this regard, this 
paper contributes towards a more effective recovery process, so that more people 
can benefit from the microfinancing facilities. Several suggestions are highlighted 
to maximize the benefits of microfinance to both the creditors and borrowers with 
the objective of realizing a win-win situation for both parties. 
 





Accessibility to financing is one of the critical factors that ensures the viability and sustainability 
of a business venture. To the poor, accessibility to financing is often the biggest stumbling block 
towards realizing a business opportunity mainly due to lack of physical collateral. Realizing this 
limitation, microfinance is being introduced with the objective of providing the poor the 
accessibility to finance so that their standard of living can be improved. Microfinance can be 
seen as an effort to improve poor people’s access to loans and saving services. A survey by 
Paxton (1996) showed that there were about 200 microfinance institutions (MFI) managing 
around 13 million loans worth US$7 billion and 45 million savings accounts worth US$19 
billion worldwide in 1995. At the end of 2006, the number of MFIs has increased to 704, serving 
about 52 million borrowers with US$23.3 billion in outstanding loans and 56 million savers with 
total deposits amounting to US$15.4 billion. Of these microfinance recipients, 70 percent were in 
Asia, 20 percent in Latin America and the balance in the rest of the world. 
 
Based on the current market trend, microfinance can be categorized as a rapidly growing 
market as the support for it comes not only from the commercial aspect but also the social aspect. 
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A movement seeks to establish credit as a human right and to raise $20 billion to provide 
microfinance to 100 million of the world’s poorest families by 2005 (Daley-Harris, 2002; 
Microcredit Summit, 1996). Today, microfinance has a global outreach and become the fastest 
growing and most widely recognized anti-poverty tool. The concept of microfinance has been 
widely accepted and applied as an element of national development policy for poverty reduction 
strategy in many countries throughout the world.  
 
Despite its remarkable achievements, there remained several weaknesses in microfinance 
that need to be improved to ensure its continuous development and successful implementation. A 
critical aspect of microfinance that needs to be focused on is the risks management aspect. 
Micro-finance is entrapped by various types of risks, such as default risk (Goetz and Gupta, 
1995), disaster risks (Kumar and Newport, 2005), currency risk (Lewis, 2005), interest rate risk 
(Hughes and Awimbo, 2000; Rahman, 2005) and commercialization risk (MicroBanking 
Bulletin, 2003). 
 
While the success story of microfinance has commonly been attributed to the Grameen 
(Village) Bank of Bangladesh which was founded in 1976, several complications can be traced 
to the US experience in the late 1970s.  The precursors of microfinance rural credit and small 
farmer credit had a history of dramatic policy failure. The experience in Ohio has shown that  
attempts  to  provide the  poor  people, in particular the small  farmers  with  small  loans  had 
been a disastrous policy (Adams et al., 1984). The program failed  to  get  credit  to  poor  
people,  did  little  to  improve agricultural yields and had high rates of default such that viable 
rural finance institutions could not be established. Poor people were viewed as simply, not being 
bankable. The high unit costs of transactions, inability of poor people to repay loans and political 
manipulation of such initiatives meant that development policy should withdraw from this 
domain and leave all banking to the private, for-profit sector. 
 
This paper focuses on the issue of managing default risk in the specific context of 
microfinance. Default risk is chosen instead of other type of risks because default risk has severe 
negative repercussions on the success of microfinance. A series of defaults could lead to liquidity 
problem in the MFIs and would consequently limit the ability of the MFIs to extend loan to other 
recipients. As would be revealed later, due to the serious consequences of defaulted loans, the 
MFIs might resort to various ways to reduce the possibility of default among the borrowers.  To 
be meaningful, this paper quotes several real cases of default incidences and based on these 
incidences, it provides recommendations to handle the default risks. The objective of this paper 
is to provide a comprehensive exploratory study on the various ways to handle default risks in 
microfinance. Ultimately, as the incidences of customers defaulting on the loans being reduced, 
this leads to a more effective credit recovery process, thus more people can benefit from the 
microfinance facility. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the next section discusses the issue of 
default risks in microfinance. Having understood the magnitude of the default risk problem in 
microfinance, Section 3 presents several real incidences of default in microfinance in 
Bangladesh. Section 4 identifies the causes of defaults in microfinancing and Section 5 provides 




2. IS DEFAULT RISK AN ISSUE IN MICROFINANCE? 
 
Default risk refers to a situation where the lenders are unable to recover the loans that have been 
extended or the borrowers fail to fulfill their financial obligations at the stipulated time due to 
various reasons. In general, default risk is claimed to be a non-issue in microfinance. Taking 
Grameen Bank as an example, since its inception, the bank has distributed around Tk347.75 
billion (or an equivalent of US$6.55 billion) in loans. Of this amount, Tk313.11 billion (or 
US$5.87 billion) has been repaid
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. The bank claims a loan recovery rate of 98.4 percent in 2003, 
an improvement compared to the 95 percent recovery rate claimed in 1998. In short, micro-
lending is known to have very low default rate, such as in the case of Grameen Bank which has a 
default rate of as low as 2 percent
4
.  
However, many critics doubt this recovery rate, particularly on the definition that 
Grameen Bank uses to categorize loan as default as well as the method of recovering the loans 
being extended. Micro lenders have been reluctant to highlight the weaknesses of Grameen Bank 
mainly due to its well-known reputation as a symbol of microfinance. However, in the recent 
years, the repayment difficulties faced by Grameen Bank are even acknowledged by the founder 
himself, Mr. Yunus. Several factors have been attributed to the repayment difficulties such as 
political upheavals, the 1998 flood and management errors. Information lag due to inefficiency is 
also quoted as another reason, where the recovery rate of 95 percent was only true until 1996.  
In 2001, about half the loan portfolio in two northern districts of Bangladesh that have 
been used to highlight Grameen's success is overdue by at least a year. For Grameen bank as a 
whole, 19 percent of loans are one year overdue (Pearl and Philips, 2001). Grameen itself defines 
a loan as delinquent if it still isn't paid off two years after its due date. Under this definition, 
about 10 percent of all the bank's loans are overdue. As a comparison, in 1997, 4.6 percent of 
Grameen's loans were more than two years overdue. The worst case is in the Tangail region with 
32.1 percent of the loans are two-years overdue. There are also other issues such as stiff 
competition among the MFIs. In Tangail for example, villagers recalled that they were being 
offered by seven competing microlenders -- a typical repayment plan for a 1,000-taka ($17) loan 
is 25 taka a week for 46 weeks. At an annualized rate, that works out to 30 percent in interest. 
Also, it is estimated that around 23 to 40 percent of families have multiple borrowings from 
several MFIs in Tangail. Also, there is the issue of repeat borrowers who have become 
dependent on loans for household expenditures rather than capital investments. Studies of micro 
credit programs have found that women often act merely as collection agents for their husbands 




More importantly, field investigations revealed that the high degree of loan recovery in 
microfinance is partly contributed by some element of “forced-recovery” imposed on the 
borrowers, either directly or indirectly. Informal interviews with the villagers and direct 
observations in the villages seem to indicate that there are actually frequent incidences of default 
in microfinance. In some cases where the borrowers are not able to pay back their loans, they are 
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pressured to repay with whatever means that they have. In several circumstances, the borrowers 
faced losses where their business or agriculture projects do not bear fruit but they still have to 
repay according to the agreement that they have had with the MFIs. As a result, these borrowers 
were forced to sell off their lands or whatever property that they have, making them poorer than 
they were before and sometimes even making them homeless. Obviously, in this case, the MFIs 
are successful in recovering the loan that they have extended but the true objective of 




3. REAL INCIDENCES OF DEFAULTS IN MICROFINANCE 
 
Based on field visits, in this section, we present several real incidences of default cases. 
Subsequently, the causes of default in microfinance can be identified and from there on, several 
recommendations can be suggested to minimize default risks in microfinance. 
 
From the following incidences of default, it can be concluded that the MFIs are only 
concern about extending financing without much effort being done to provide any form of post-
disbursement supervision. Post-disbursement supervision is highly relevant in ensuring the 
success of microfinance project due to the fact that around 80 percent of the recipients of 
microfinance are illiterate women. Furthermore, around 82 percent of these women had no 
business experience before joining the microfinance program, while the rest 18 percent had some 
basic business experiences. The illiteracy of the recipients is rather serious to the extent that 
some do not even know how to count the amount of money that they received from the MFIs. 
Commonly, the MFIs provide loan without any technical assistance except for some briefing of 
around five to ten minutes to the recipients. It should be emphasized that the technical assistance 
is just as important and should complement the financial assistance in ensuring the success of the 
business project. 
 
Case 1: Lack of post-disbursement supervision leading to moral hazard 
In many instances, once the fund is being released to the recipient, there is no close supervision 
of how the fund is being utilize. This results in the tendency of moral hazard on the part of the 
recipients. For example, in a particular case, the recipient is supposed to expand her chicken-
rearing farm has instead given the money to her husband on the pre-text of undertaking a more 
profitable business venture. However, the business venture did not turn in to be profitable, and as 
a result, the recipient failed to pay the installment of the microfinance loan. After a year, the 
original amount of loan became almost doubled and the recipient had to pay the debt by selling 
her house which made the family homeless. This case showed the importance of post-
disbursement supervision to avoid the incentive of using the microfinance loan for other reasons 
than what has been agreed upon. More alarmingly, this case showed that the recipient took 
whatever it takes to repay the MFI, resulting in a further deterioration in the standard of living of 
the recipient. 
 
Case 2: Lack of training on basic business skills and knowledge 
Several incidences of default happened due to lack of basic skills such as book-keeping or 
recording of sale transactions. As mentioned, based on a survey on the recipients of microfinance 
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loan from an MFI in Bangladesh, around 82 percent of respondents had no business experience 
before joining the microfinance program and only 18 percent had some business experiences. 
The lack of experience resulted in the recipients unable to manage their business projects 
effectively, leading to a business failure. In a specific case, a recipient had to close down a tea 
stall that had been set up using a microfinance facility due to lack of basic business skills and 
knowledge. Due to illiteracy, the recipient had difficulties to do calculations and keep track of 
the everyday sales. In the absence of systematic recording of profit or loss in the business, it was 
difficult for the recipient to estimate expenses that are made allowable by the available profits. 
As a result, a few months later the recipient had to close the stall and sold it off because of the 
failure to pay the weekly installments. This is a clear case of default case resulting from the lack 
of basic business skills and knowledge.  
 
Case 3: Lack of health awareness resulting in the need to spend on medical expenses 
As a result of poverty and illiteracy, there is a general lack of awareness on the importance of 
sanitation and cleanness as well as the importance of healthy food intakes and disease 
prevention. Family member’s illness is one of the reasons leading to recipients to channel the 
funds provided by the MFIs to pay for medical treatment, resulting in default in payments. In a 
specific case, a goat-rearing project funded by an MFI turned out to be successful at the initial 
stage that it provides the recipient with some profit and the ability to repay. However, a family 
member’s illness led the recipient to sell-off the goats in efforts to pay for the medical bills. The 
recipient later defaulted on the payment.  
  
Case 4: Burdensome immediate repayment schedule  
Most microfinance contracts require repayments to start immediately after the loan is disbursed. 
Since it is common to have weekly payment schedule, most payments normally start the 
following week after the loan has been disbursed. This payment arrangement proved to be a 
challenging situation for new and non-experienced recipients since most projects undertaken by 
microfinance recipients need some incubation period. In a specific case, a woman failed to pay 
the weekly installments which started directly after the loan was being disbursed simply because 
her chicken-rearing activity had yet to turn in some profit.  
 
Case 5: Lack of motivation to improve standard of living 
It is often overlooked that the mindset of the poor and illiterate are very much different from 
those who are educated. The poor people have no incentive to give the best to ensure the success 
of a business project since their major concern is on meeting the daily consumption requirements 
or just to fulfill the basic needs. In a particular case, a recipient with five children were more 
concerned to make end meets by setting up a road-side stall and were not concerned about 
further improving their standard of living. Due to lack of motivation, the recipient had no effort 
to really give out the best that she could even though she was provided with the financial 
assistance. This would increase the likelihood of default of the loan being extended. 
 
 
Case 6: Multiple borrowings from different MFIs 
There are also incidences that borrowers took up loans from more than one source. While there is 
a clear rule that disallowed this from happening unless the first loan is fully paid-off, various 
ways were being done to go around the rule. In a specific case, a person took loan from an MFI 
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using his name and took a second loan from another MFI using a relative’s name. Even though 
the loans from the two different MFIs were being used for a poultry project, the project did not 
turn in a high profit as expected. As a result, the recipient faced difficulties to pay for the two 
installments simultaneously. The recipient then started to pay for only one installment at a time, 
but was pressured by the other MFI to pay for the installment. Due to the inability to pay, the 
recipient later had to sell the poultry farm to pay back the loan even though it was profitable. 
 
 
4. CAUSES OF DEFAULTS IN MICROFINANCE 
 
Based on the real incidences of default mentioned above, in general, the causes of default can be 
divided into two categories: (i) weaknesses from the lender side, particularly in the funds 
administration by the MFIs; and (ii) moral hazard problem on the borrower side. 
  
(a) Lender side -Weaknesses in funds administration: these are weaknesses relating to funds 
administration by the MFIs that provide the opportunities for the recipients to utilize the loans 
for other reasons than the original intentions. This increases the possibility of default by the 
recipients.  
i. Absence of post-disbursement monitoring system: in the absence of a close 
supervision on how funds are being disbursed, recipients tend to utilize the funds 
for other reasons than the original purpose that the funds were released for. 
ii. Lack of technical assistance given to the microfinance recipients: as mentioned, 
82 percent of the recipients had no business experience before joining the 
microfinance program, while the rest had some basic business experience. As a 
result, the recipients cannot handle their business effectively without basic 
technical assistance being provided by the MFIs.  
iii. Inexperienced field workers: the field workers who are working for the MFIs are 
lowly educated and lack of experience. Most of them are SSC (equal to O’ level) 
or HSC (equal to A’ level) holders and are very young. As a result, they fail to 
deliver effectively the objectives of the MFIs to the recipients, what more to give 
motivations to the recipients.  
iv. Burdensome immediate weekly payment system: the fixed repayment system is 
difficult to be met by many recipients, depending on the nature of their business 
projects. Also, very frequent collection schedule increases the transaction costs to 
collect the installments for the MFIs. 
v. Lack of common accessible database of the microfinance recipients: since there is 
no systematic database that keeps the record of the microfinance recipients, this 
provides the opportunity for the recipients to apply for more than one loan from 
various MFIs. When the recipients are over-stretched in their financial 
commitments, they are more likely to default on the installment payment. 
 
(b) Borrower side - moral hazard problem: resulting from the lack of technical assistance and 
post-disbursement supervision, followings are the consequences which result in greater 
possibility of default by the loan recipients: 
i. Hiding business: majority of the recipients are women and in a male-dominant 
society such as Bangladesh, women are normally obedient to whatever the 
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requests of the husbands. In many cases, once the wife has secured a loan to run a 
particular business, the husband persuades the wife to undertake more risky 
business that more likely to provide higher return. Thus, lack of proper 
monitoring system by the MFI could lead to recipients to undertake more risky 
business, thereby increasing the possibility of default by the borrower.  
ii. Family member’s illness: rather than utilizing the loans through the channel that 
has been agreed upon, the recipients spent it for more urgent and pressing reason 
such as for medication of the family member. There are also cases where the 
focus of attention has shifted to taking care of the sick ones, resulting in the 
business project to be abandoned. Other than illness, funds are also sometimes 
being spent for other expenses such as marriage and festivities. 
iii. Lack of motivations: the mindset of the poor which is more concern about 
meeting the basic needs does not provide them with the motivations to give out 
the best in conducting the business project. 
iv. Over-stretched financial commitments due to multiple borrowings from MFIs: 
amid the increased competition among the MFIs and the absence of a common 
database to keep track of the microfinance recipients, many recipients borrow 






5.1 To enhance post-disbursement monitoring system 
In efforts to reduce the moral hazard problem after the funds are disbursed, there is an urgent 
need for the MFI to closely monitor how the funds are being spent by the recipients. Post-
disbursement monitoring system would include close supervision on the status or progress of the 
business undertaken and some technical assistance in achieving a viable business project. This 
includes advice to be given during the initial stage, ensuring consistent progress evaluation, 
marketing and ensuring the continuity of the business. 
 
5.2 Direct purchasing of equipment and limit the amount of cash disbursement 
The structure of financing determines the extent to which the recipient can maneuver with the 
funds being released. Since in general, around 50 to 60 percent of the loans are needed to buy 
machinery or equipment related to the business project, the MFI can appoint an agent to purchase 
the machinery right away, without having to release that portion of the funds to the recipients. 
The lesser the amount of cash given to the recipient, the smaller the chances of moral hazard 
occurring. In the case of chicken farm, the MFI might appoint a supplier for equipment and the 
chicken, and some cash to meet the daily expenses to run the farm. Deciding on the appropriate 
proportion of cash to be disbursed can substantially reduce the moral hazard problem and 
ultimately reduce the default risk in microfinance. 
 
5.3 Appointment of central purchaser of business output and direct payment to MFIs from 
central purchaser  
For projects that are undertaken on a relatively large scale basis such as on the “one village one 
industry basis”, the MFIs can arrange that the output of the industry to be sold to only the 
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appointed purchaser. The importance of selling the business output to the appointed purchaser is 
so that there can be an arrangement that a certain portion of the sale can be used to repay the 
microfinance loan and the balance to be returned to the seller/recipient as profit. By this way, the 
repayment is ensured and the risk of default can be reduced substantially. 
 
5.4 Strong training system for recipients and field workers of MFIs 
Basic business skill and knowledge are very much needed to ensure a viable business venture in 
a microfinance program. As such, the financial support provided by the MFIs must also be 
complemented with the technical support to the recipient. Indirectly, this ensures close 
supervision of the project at every stage of the business venture since it requires an active 
participation of the MFIs starting from its planning period until the plan for expansion. For 
instance, the technical assistance would require pre-disbursement support (in terms of project 
assessment or viability and providing the recipients with the basic knowledge in the particular 
project of interest); initial stage of fund disbursement (purchasing of machines and ensuring 
quality raw materials); mid-course evaluation (ensuring progress of the project) and final stage 
consulting (marketing of produce and expansion plan which include possible down-stream 
activities). It is important to note that all the technical supports needed require that the field 
workers of the MFIs to be well-equipped with the skills and knowledge to convey effective 
advice to the recipients. There is, therefore, a need for a strong and intensive training system for 
the field workers as well.  
 
5.5 Insurance policy and health awareness campaign for recipients 
To avoid the recipients to use the loan for more pressing personal needs such as for medical 
expenses, the MFIs can require the recipient to also undertake insurance policy for health 
coverage. Health issue is highly relevant in microfinance since approximately 10 to 15 percent of 
the recipients defaulted on their loan payments to meet medical expenses for the family 
members. As a result, insurance policy for health coverage for the recipients could indirectly 
reduce the possibility of default in microfinance. In addition, as a way of prevention, the MFIs 
could have the health awareness campaign which include promoting cleanliness, proper 
sanitation and good eating habits to reduce the diseases which is quite common among the 
recipients. 
 
5.6 Project-specific repayment schedule  
Immediate fixed repayment schedule on either weekly or monthly basis for all type of projects 
has shown to be burdensome for many recipients, particularly those with business projects that 
require relatively long incubation period. MFIs should be aware that the time needed for a 
business project to turn in profit depends on the nature of business, for example, chicken-rearing 
farm takes at least two weeks, while goat-rearing farm takes about one to two months. In this 
circumstance, MFIs should discuss with the borrower and need to know the real nature of 
business before deciding on the repayment plan. Payment should ideally starts after the 
incubation period, once the farm produce can be sold. In this regard, a more flexible repayment 
schedule would benefit clients and potentially improve their repayment capacity.  
 
5.7 Motivational programs for recipients 
To ensure the recipients are motivated to do the best in whatever business project that they are 
undertaking, frequent motivational talks should be given to the recipients so as to have a 
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paradigm shift to further improve their standard of living. At the same time, it is also important 
to remind the recipients of their responsibility to ensure the success of the business project, thus 
to be able to re-pay the MFIs of the loan that have been extended. In this regard, there is a need 
to enhance the poor people’s self-confidence so as to make them believe that they can succeed in 
life if they strive for it. One way to increase the motivation of the poor is through the 
motivational camp which could include a series of motivational talks and some training on the 
basic skills and knowledge needed in running a particular type of business.  The motivational 
camp will not only motivate the recipients but will also strengthen the creditor-borrower 
relationship such that the recipients will feel obligated to ensure the success of the business 
project so as to be able to repay the creditors as promised.  
 
5.8 Support from Government 
Since microfinance has become a major anti-poverty tool in many developing countries, 
microfinance could be used to complement government’s objective to eradicate poverty. As 
such, MFIs could get the support from the government that could ensure its successful 
implementation. Smart partnership between the MFIs and the government would help to expedite 
the implementation of microfinance in poverty alleviation on a national scale basis. While the 
MFIs could extend financial assistance, the government could contribute in terms of promoting 
healthy lifestyle among the recipients as well as providing education infrastructure to the poor 
people. All these work hand in hand to ensure the success of microfinance projects, thus, 
reducing the possibility of default among the borrowers. The government could also provide a 
conducive environment for microfinance to grow by providing favorable tax incentives for the 
parties involve in microfinance.  
 
5.9 Establish a common database of micro-finance recipients 
To avoid the possibility of borrowers defaulting due to over-stretched financial commitments 
resulting from multiple borrowings from MFIs, there needs to be a collaborative effort among 
the MFIs and government to set up a common database for all microfinance recipients. This 
database should be accessible to all the creditors and regulators so that effective screening 
process can be done in terms of the eligibility for the amount of loans. The database should also 
provide demographic information that could reveal the risk profiles of the borrowers. This would 
enable to MFIs to tailor-made the loan according to the specific borrower’s demographic factors. 
The database could also reveal the information on the level of basic training and motivational 
advice needed by the recipients to start the business.  
 
5.10 Implementing the concept Islamic micro-finance 
Bangladesh is a majority Muslim country where around 90 percent of its population is Muslims. 
Equity financing as proposed by Islamic finance could be the best solution to most of the 
problems highlighted. In particular, mudharabah and musyarakah (or a combination of both) can 
be adopted so that there will be active participation by both parties to ensure the success of a 
business venture. This risk-sharing concept is well-suited for microfinancing since the MFIs can 
provide capital and while the recipients could provide their work effort and be compensated 
accordingly. Since, the basic concept of mudarabah is that in the event of financial loss, the 
owner of the capital (rabbul mal) will bear the loss, it is then in the best interest of the MFIs to 
ensure close supervision of the project being undertaken.  
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The concept of ijarah (Islamic leasing) is also highly relevant in the context of 
microfinance. The MFIs can have ownership of the equipment or machinery needed in the 
business project and lease the equipment and machinery to the microfinance recipients in return 
for rental.
6
 In return, the MFI can use utilize the concept of operational lease where the MFI will 
purchase and maintain assets which are necessary for the people like poultry firm or dairy firm 
instruments. The MFI will rent there assets to the clients on terms and conditions agreed upon for 
a specific time. After the termination of the period the assets will be returned to the MFI. The 
MFI then lease the same assets to a new lessee. The MFI will bear the risk of recession or 






Since microfinance is seen as a noble effort to provide accessibility of financing to the poor 
people, ensuring its continuous successful implementation is therefore, very crucial. While 
conceptually, the implementation of microfinance is simple and results in numerous advantages 
to the parties involved particularly the poor people, in practice, there are several issues that need 
to be handled in ensuring that the objectives of microfinancing can be achieved.  
 
This paper highlights several factors that lead to increased possibility of business failure 
thus, the risk of default in microfinance. Weaknesses in the post-disbursement funds 
administration by the MFIs has been identified as the major factor resulting in increased default 
risk since it provides the opportunities for the recipients to utilize the loans for other reasons than 
what has been agreed upon. Other lender-side factors that increase the likelihood of business 
failure and default risk are lack of technical assistance given to the microfinance recipients, 
inexperienced field workers, burdensome immediate fixed payment system and lack of common 
accessible database of the microfinance recipients to avoid multiple borrowings from various 
MFIs.  There are also borrower-specific factors relating to moral hazard problem that increase 
the possibility of default on payment such as hiding of business, spending for more imminent 
needs such as medical expenses, lack of motivations to improve the standard of living and over-
stretched financial commitments due to multiple borrowings from the MFIs. 
 
Based on these factors, the paper suggests several ways to reduce these problems from 
occurring, thus to reduce the possibility of default in microfinance. In efforts to reduce the moral 
hazard problem after the funds are disbursed, there is an urgent need for the MFIs to have a 
monitoring system of ensuring that the funds are being spent as has been agreed upon by the 
recipients. It is also suggested that it is best for the MFIs to directly purchase the relevant 
equipment for the business project and limit the amount of cash disbursement to reduce the 
default risk. The MFIs can also appoint a central purchaser for the business output and require 
that part of the sale payment goes for payment installment to the MFIs and the balance goes to 
the recipients. Hence, default risks can be reduced substantially.  
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With regard to reducing the possibility of default due to unsuccessful business venture, 
there is an urgent need for a strong training system for recipients and field workers of MFIs. 
Since health issue is highly relevant in microfinance, requiring the recipients to undertake health 
insurance policy as part of the microfinance package will prove to be beneficial. It is also 
important to increase the awareness on the importance of health among the recipients. In efforts 
to reduce the inability to repay due to burdensome fixed repayment schedule, it was suggested 
that repayment plan based on project-specific basis should be considered. On motivating the poor 
people so that they will give out their best to ensure the success of the microfinance project and 
to further improve their standard of living, conducting motivational programs can be beneficial 
for recipients. The programs would also to strengthen the creditor-borrower relationship such 
that the recipients are aware of their obligations to repay the creditors as promised, thus ensuring 
the success of the business projects. Since microfinance has become a major anti-poverty tool in 
many developing countries, microfinance could be used to complement government’s objective 
to eradicate poverty. Smart partnership between the MFIs and the government would help to 
expedite the successful implementation of microfinance in poverty alleviation on a national scale 
basis. There is also the need to have a common database of micro-finance recipients so as to 
avoid the possibility of borrowers defaulting due to over-stretched financial commitments 
resulting from multiple borrowings from MFIs.  
 
Last but not least, all the suggestions highlighted above can be implemented directly if 
the MFIs implement the concept of Islamic microfinance. Equity financing, namely mudarabah 
and musharakah (or a combination of both) can be adopted so that there will be active 
participation by both parties from the very beginning until the end to ensure the success of a 
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